Search Results

Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström,
Daniel Müller and Patrick Schmitz, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2016)
Keywords: contract theory, moral hazard, hidden actions, incomplete contracts, property rights

Network Investment, Access and Competition,
Roman Inderst and Martin Peitz, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2012)
Keywords: Telecommunication; NGN, Access surcharge; Investment, Innovation; Contracts between network operators

Refunds as a Metering Device,
Roman Inderst and Gilad Tirosh, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2011)
Keywords: Refunds; Cancellation terms; Metering

Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-off Entrenchment and Shirking,
Roman Inderst, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2012)
Keywords: Employment agreements; At-will contracts; Contract duration

Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung,
Patrick Schmitz, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2000)

Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005),
Patrick Schmitz, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2006)

How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion,
Daniel Göller, from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association (2021)
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts, Behavioral Contract Theory, Reference points, Holdup, Renegotiation

Monotone contracts,
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, in Theoretical Economics (2022)
Keywords: Dynamic contracting, activities, seniority

Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts,
Mohan Bijapur, from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2011)
Keywords: moral hazard; renegotiation; commitment; multiple signals; contractual simplicity

Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?,
Patrick Schmitz, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2010)
Keywords: Conflicting tasks; Moral hazard; Synergies

Optimal Dynamic Contracting: the First-Order Approach and Beyond,
Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2015)
Keywords: Contract theory; Dynamic contracts

Contract Theory,
Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, from The MIT Press (2005)
Keywords: contract theory, microeconomics, labor, industrial organization, corporate finance

Solutions Manual to Accompany Contract Theory,
Arthur Campbell, Moshe Cohen, Florian Ederer and Johannes Spinnewijn, from The MIT Press (2007)
Keywords: contract theory

Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation,
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp, from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE (2018)
Keywords: compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal-agent models, informativeness principle

Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,
Joseph Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun, from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2013)

Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation,
Roman Inderst and Marcus Opp, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2019)
Keywords: Compensation design; Duration of pay; Moral hazard; Persistence; Principal-agent models; Informativeness principle

Social vs. risk preferences under the veil of ignorance,
Nicola Frignani and Giovanni Ponti, from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) (2011)
Keywords: Keywords: dictator games, social preferences, risk preferences, functional identification.

A Note on Convex Transformations and the First Order Approach,
Corrado Benassi, from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (2011)
Keywords: Principal agent problem, first order approach

Correlation and relative performance evaluation,
Pierre Fleckinger, in Journal of Economic Theory (2012)
Keywords: Moral hazard; Correlation; Relative vs joint performance evaluation;

On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach,
Ohad Kadan and Jeroen M. Swinkels, in Journal of Economic Theory (2013)
Keywords: Principal–agent; Moral hazard; First-order approach;

Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem,
Sofia Moroni and Jeroen Swinkels, in Journal of Economic Theory (2014)
Keywords: Moral hazard; Principal–agent models; Optimal contract; Existence; Mirrlees non-existence example;

A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory,
Giovanni Immordino, Anna Maria Menichini and Maria Romano, in Economics Letters (2011)
Keywords: Hidden action; Anticipatory utility; Impossibility;

Risk versus social preferences under the veil of ignorance,
Nicola Frignani and Giovanni Ponti, in Economics Letters (2012)
Keywords: Dictator games; Social preferences; Risk preferences; Functional identification;

Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?,
Patrick Schmitz, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2023)
Keywords: moral hazard; limited liability; hidden action; incentive contracts; job design

Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs,
Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich (2009)
Keywords: job design; high-performance work systems; screening; reputation; competition; trust; control; social preferences; complementarities

Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union,
Peter Kuhn and Jacques Robert, from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. (1988)
Keywords: unions, seniority, wages, layoffs,

Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory,
Nobel Prize Committee, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract theory;

Contract theory,
Nobel Prize Committee, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract theory;

Incomplete Contracts and Control,
Oliver Hart, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract Theory;

Pay for Performance and Beyond,
Bengt Holmstrom, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract theory;

Interview with 2016 Laureate in Economics Oliver Hart,
Oliver Hart, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract Theory;

Interview with 2016 Economics Laureate Bengt Holmström,
Bengt Holmstrom, from Nobel Prize Committee (2016)
Keywords: Contract Theory;

Biographical,
Oliver Hart, from Nobel Prize Committee (2017)
Keywords: Contract theory;

Biographical,
Bengt Holmström, from Nobel Prize Committee (2017)
Keywords: contract theory;

Monotone contracts,
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2019)
Keywords: Dynamic contracting, stochastic opportunities.

Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains,
Kannan Govindan and Maria Nicoleta Popiuc, from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics (2011)
Keywords: Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

A Simple Impossibility Result in Behavioral Contract Theory,
Anna Maria Menichini, Giovanni Immordino and Maria Romano, from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy (2010)
Keywords: Hidden action, anticipatory utility.

Repeated moral hazard with costly self-control,
Łukasz Woźny, from Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis (2016)
Keywords: repeated moral hazard, self-control costs, temptation, principal-agent, optimal contract

Performance Measurement in Agency Models,
Chang Koo Chi and Kyoung Jin Choi, from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics (2019)
Keywords: Agency problems; performance measurement; informativeness criterion; signal orderings

Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk,
Borys Grochulski, Russell Wong and Yuzhe Zhang, from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (2017)
Keywords: dynamic moral hazard; job destruction; jump risk

Monotone Contracts,
Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug, from Barcelona School of Economics (2019)
Keywords: dynamic contracting, activities, seniority

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection,
Theodoros Diasakos and Kostas Koufopoulos, from Collegio Carlo Alberto (2011)
Keywords: Insurance Market; Adverse Selection; Incentive Efficiency

Claim Validation,
Nabil Al-Najjar, Luciano Pomatto and Alvaro Sandroni, in American Economic Review (2014)

The Phenomenon of Information Asymmetry Between the Supplier and the Client in IT Projects,
Bartosz Wachnik, in Problemy Zarzadzania (2017)
Keywords: asymmetry information, IT projects

Estudio del agente-principal en la agricultura,
Marta Fernández Olmos and Luz María Marín Vinuesa, in El Trimestre Económico (2009)
Keywords: Principal-Agent theory, sharecropping, contract choice, teoría del principal agente, aparcería, selección contractual

Performance Monitoring and Financial Disclosure Choice,
Phillip C. Stocken and Robert E. Verrecchia, in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (1999)

Principal-agent,
Louis-André Gérard-Varet, from Universite Aix-Marseille III (2000)
Keywords: RISQUE MORAL ; CONTRATS ; MODELES ECONOMIQUES ; PRINCIPAL-AGENT ; SELECTION ADVERSE

Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience,
Amihai Glazer, from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences (2000)
Keywords: INFORMATION

Multidimensional Cheap Talk,
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2004)
Keywords: Cheap talk; Political economy; Lobbying

An Elementary Approach to the Hold-Up Problem with Renegotiation,
Urs Schweizer, from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) (2000)
Keywords: hold-up problem, renegotiation, mechanism design, message contingent contracts

Direct Mechanisms, Menus and Latent Contracts,
Gwenael Piaser, from University Library of Munich, Germany (2007)
Keywords: Common Agency, Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Direct Mechanisms, Menus, Latent Contracts

Las capacidades de absorción del conocimiento como ventajas competitivas para la inserción de pymes en cadenas globales de valor,
Mario Barcelo-Valenzuela, Jaime Olea-Miranda and Oscar F. Contreras, in Estudios Gerenciales (2016)
Keywords: Capacidades de absorción; Conocimiento; Cadenas globales de valor

Credible social insurance,
Christopher Sleet, from Society for Economic Dynamics (2004)
Keywords: Macroeconomic policy, dynamic contracting

Trust Relations,
Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Kyle Bagwell, from Society for Economic Dynamics (2004)
Keywords: trust, dynamic games

Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case,
Thomas Tröger and Timofiy Mylovanov, from University of Mannheim, Department of Economics (2012)
Keywords: mechanism design, informed principal, ex-ante optimality, buyout option

On durable goods markets with entry and adverse selection,
Maarten Janssen and Santanu Roy, in Canadian Journal of Economics (2004)

Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique,
Georges Casamatta and Wilfried Sand-Zantman, in Revue économique (2002)

Job design and randomization in principal agent models,
Wolfgang R. K�hler, from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich (2008)
Keywords: Job design, multi-task agency, ex-ante randomization, moral hazard

A Model of Grants Distribution: A Screening Approach,
Suren Basov and Peter Bardsley, from Econometric Society (2004)
Keywords: multidimensional screening

Three results on communication, information and common knowledge,
Sonia Weyers, from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1992)

Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations,
Aviad Heifetz and Heracles Polemarchakis, from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1995)
Keywords: Rational expectations, partial revelation

Costly Expertise,
Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv, in American Economic Review (2008)

Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals,
Eric Maskin, in American Economic Review (2008)

Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification,
Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Barton Lipman, in American Economic Review (2014)

Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory,
Roger Myerson, in American Economic Review (2008)

Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms,
Thomas Mariotti, Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Alessandro Pavan, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2021)
Keywords: Incomplete information; Competing mechanisms; Private disclosures; Folk theorems; Universal mechanisms

Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals,
David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer, in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2022)

Riding Free On The Signals Of Others,
Kim Alexander-Cook, Dan Bernhardt and Joanne Roberts, from Economics Department, Queen's University (1995)
Keywords: signaling, increasing returns to scale, incomplete information, free-riding

Welfare Benefits and incomes of Canadian Families: A Dynamic Analysis of Marital-Cohabitation Dissolution,
Pierre Lefebvre and Philip Merrigan, from Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques (1995)

First Order Approach for Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending: The Two Period Case,
Nicola Pavoni and Arphad Abraham, from Society for Economic Dynamics (2004)
Keywords: Dynamic Moral Hazard, First Order Approach, Hidden Assets

Informational Smallness in Rational Expectations Equilibria,
A Heifetz and Enrico Minelli, from Tel Aviv (1997)
Keywords: INFORMATION ; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

Knowledge at Equilibrium,
Enrico Minelli and Heracles Polemarchakis, from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1993)

Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,
Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli, from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (1994)
Keywords: communication equilibrium, incomplete information, Nash equilibrium, repeated game

Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability,
Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet, from Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques (1995)

Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,
Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet, from Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques (1996)

Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information,
Daniel Garrett, Renato Gomes and Lucas Maestri, in The Review of Economic Studies (2019)
Keywords: Competition, Screening, Heterogeneous information, Price discrimination, Adverse selection

Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals,
Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann and Patrick Schmitz, from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) (2000)
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Ex Post Information, Wealth Constraints, Upward Distortion

The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees,
Winand Emons and Nuno Garoupa, from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2004)
Keywords: Contingent fees; Conditional fees; Moral hazard; Incentives

Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer,
Hiroshi Osano, in Review of Economic Design (1999)
Keywords: Renegotiation, multi-agent, implementation

original papers: On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results,
Peter S. Faynzilberg and Praveen Kumar, in Review of Economic Design (2000)
Keywords: Generalized agency, moral hazard, adverse selection, separability, existence

Cycles and multiple equilibria in the market for durable lemons,
Maarten Janssen and Vladimir Karamychev, in Economic Theory (2002)
Keywords: Dynamic trading, Asymmetric information, Entry, Durable goods.

Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss,
Hector Chade and Virginia N. Vera de Serio, in Economic Theory (2002)
Keywords: Moral hazard, Principal-agent, Risk aversion.

The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Enterpreneurship,
David de Meza and Clive Southey, from University of Exeter, Department of Economics (1995)
Keywords: CREDIT;BANKS;INFORMATION

Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent,
Aggey Semenov, in Canadian Journal of Economics (2018)

Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets,
Bruno Jullien and Alessandro Pavan, in The Review of Economic Studies (2019)
Keywords: Platform markets, Dispersed information, Design, Information management, Informative advertising, Market ignition, Global games

Dynamic yardstick regulation,
Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Sonje Reiche, from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2003)
Keywords: Yardstick regulation; ratchet effect; short and long-term contracts; commitment

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence,
Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya, in Games and Economic Behavior (2013)
Keywords: Incomplete information; Information structure; Correlated equilibrium; Garbling; Robustness;

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness,
Aaron Archer and Robert Kleinberg, in Games and Economic Behavior (2014)
Keywords: Truthful mechanism design; Implementation theory; Incentive compatibility; Local-to-global characterization; Multi-dimensional types; Cyclic monotonicity; Weak monotonicity; Vortex-freeness; Truthful stitching; Rochet's theorem; Stokes's theorem; Saks–Yu theorem; First-order logic; Orthogonal polynomials;

Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums,
Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen and David C. Parkes, in Games and Economic Behavior (2014)
Keywords: Question and answer forums; User generated content; Contests;

Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders,
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu and Robert Kleinberg, in Games and Economic Behavior (2015)
Keywords: Bayesian mechanism design; Approximation Algorithms;